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to Belgian data
Introduction
Failure  prediction  models  are  defined  as  models  that 
assign a probability of failure or a credit score to firms. (1) 
The development of the Basel II framework for regulatory 
capital requirements has stimulated vendors to offer such 
models to banks opting to use the internal ratings-based 
approach for calculating their regulatory capital require-
ment.  Indeed,  one  of  the  inputs  that  banks  adopting 
the internal ratings-based approach must provide is an 
estimate of the probability of default (PD) for each firm 
borrower.
Models offered by vendors to calculate PDs, or credit scores 
which can be mapped into PDs, are often used by banks 
as an off-the-shelf product or, alternatively, as a basis for 
development  and  benchmarking  of  their  own  internal 
rating  systems.  Although  there  exists  a  vast  academic 
literature on failure prediction models (see, e.g., Balcaen 
and Ooghe, 2006 for a review), much less is known about 
failure prediction models offered by vendors.
The purpose of this article is twofold. First, it provides an 
overview of differences in vendor models for private (i.e. 
non-listed) firms, with respect to model inputs, output, 
methodology  and  field  of  application.  Second,  it  uses 
data for 40,000 small and medium-size Belgian firms to 
compare model output. One of the questions addressed 
is  whether  different  models  yield  significantly  different 
output, or “ﾭrankings” for the same firm. In other words, 
is there much disagreement between models ? This ques-
tion is important because if banks use the PD or score 
produced by a failure prediction model to price the loan 
of a borrower and if different failure prediction models 
result in significantly different PDs or scores for the same 
borrower, then the bank’s choice of model can have a 
significant impact on loan origination and pricing deci-
sions. Observing the extent of disagreement between two 
models, however, does not permit a judgement about the 
relative performance of the models ; therefore, a second 
question addressed by the article is whether some models 
better identify failing firms than others. These issues are 
investigated  by  comparing  the  output  of  two  models 
offered by vendors with the output of a failure prediction 
model developed by the National Bank of Belgium (see 
Vivet, 2004).
The analysis reveals that models do appear to frequently 
disagree in firm rankings, and the level of disagreement 
can be quite important. At the same time, all three of 
the models studied here perform similarly, and quite well, 
in  distinguishing  sample  firms  that  entered  bankruptcy 
within one year from firms that did not enter bankruptcy 
during that period (understandably, the models perform 
somewhat less well in distinguishing firms that entered 
bankruptcy  within  five  years  from  firms  that  did  not). 
This excellent performance of the three models, which is 
considered to be reassuring from a financial stability view-
point, is also important, given that the statistical methods 
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(1)  The term “ﾭfailure” here may represent either bankruptcy or default. The use of 
this term is motivated by the fact that vendor models assessing the credit risk 
of a firm may be calibrated on either bankruptcy or on default data. Bankruptcy 
data is normally available on a public basis, while default is normally non-public 
information which is generated and maintained within financial institutions.136
as well as the measure of failure (bankruptcy vs. default) 
used to estimate and calibrate the models are different.
1.    Characteristics of failure prediction 
models for private firms offered by 
vendors
The  general  principle  behind  failure  prediction  models 
consists  of  aggregating  different  types  of  information 
(inputs) through a given rule (methodology) in order to 
produce a credit “ﾭscore” or a PD (output) for a specific 
obligor  (field  of  application).  Although  this  framework 
applies to every failure prediction model, there are notable 
differences  in  the  specific  inputs,  methodology,  output 
and field of application across vendors’ models.
inPutS
Vendors typically develop failure prediction models for pri-
vate companies on very large databases that include hun-
dreds of thousands (if not millions) of financial statements. 
The selection of input variables occurs in different ways. 
Some vendors rely on expert judgement to identify inputs, 
where the expert judgement may be complemented with 
statistical analysis. Many vendors rely on more statistical 
approaches,  e.g.  a  “ﾭforward-selection”  process,  which 
consists of first identifying a set of variables that are cor-
related with business failure, then evaluating the perform-
ance of successive estimation of a statistical model, where 
the variables are tried out one by one and included in the 
model if they are statistically significant.
The variables used as inputs in failure prediction models 
are primarily quantitative ; however, qualitative variables 
are sometimes used to supplement the quantitative infor-
mation. The quantitative inputs include firm-level variables 
from financial statements (these variables can be grouped 
in  categories  such  as  leverage,  liquidity,  profitability, 
size, etc.). Sometimes industry-specific variables (such as 
industry dummies or market-based variables constructed 
from listed companies), as well as macro-economic vari-
ables (e.g. an indicator of industrial production), are also 
included.  Qualitative  information  may  include  variables 
such as the legal form of the firm, its age, its geographical 
location, the layout of its annual accounts (full or abbrevi-
ated), etc.
Most vendor models generate an output even for firms for   
which some inputs are missing. In this case, the missing 
values are generally replaced with the average (or median) 
values of the relevant population. However, some models 
do not generate an output when too many inputs for a 
firm are missing.
mEtHODOlOgy
Failure  prediction  models  for  private  firms  are  devel-
oped  using  statistical  methods  that  include  multiple 
discriminant analysis, probit (or logit) regressions, neural 
networks, decision trees, maximum expected utility and 
hybrid approaches that integrate two or more of these 
techniques (see Box 1). (1) Vendors usually perform refine-
ments of these methods ; e.g., they may not use a “ﾭpure” 
probit model but rather a probit model that involves some 
transformations of inputs and outputs.
OutPut
The output for a failure prediction model can be either 
a credit score or a PD. These measures are generated for 
different time horizons, most frequently between one and 
five years (although some models are restricted to shorter 
horizons).
In some cases, the vendors will translate the output into 
rating  estimates  expressed  using  the  standard  rating   
symbols,  where  the  rating  estimates  are  designed  to 
exhibit default rates which, in aggregate, are similar to 
those published by the main credit rating agencies (how-
ever,  the  highest  rating  estimate  attainable  for  private 
firms  may  fall  below  AAA).  Some  vendor  models  also 
allow users to map their own internal rating systems to 
rating estimates. Finally, most models offer the opportu-
nity for the user to run a scenario analysis on a company 
by  modifying  some  of  the  inputs  and  observing  the 
impact on output.
FiElD	OF	aPPlicatiOn
Some vendors offer different country-specific and, more 
rarely, industry-specific versions of their model. There are 
three  main  reasons  for  this.  First,  data  availability  may 
prevent using the same input variables for all countries 
and industries. Second, input variables may differ across 
countries  or  industries  because  determinants  of  failure 
are not the same. Third, some countries or industries are 
intrinsically riskier than others and experience therefore 
higher failure rates, even if they share the same deter-
minants of failure as other countries or industries. As a 
result, country and industry-specific versions of the same 
model  tend  to  differ  with  respect  to  their  inputs  and 
(1)  Failure prediction models developed by academics and banks also use these 
techniques, although with some differences. For instance, academic studies 
seem more frequently to use data mining techniques such as neural networks or 
support vector machines, while bank internal models tend also to rely on heuristic 
methods built on expert judgement.137
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parameter  estimates,  although  they  usually  share  the 
same methodology. In addition, some outputs (e.g. rating 
estimates) may not necessarily be available for all country 
or industry-specific versions of a model. However, when 
available, outputs have the same format and are designed 
to be comparable across model versions.
Box 1  –    Some statistical methodologies used by vendors
multiPlE	DiScRiminant	analySiS
Multiple  Discriminant  Analysis  (MDA)  is  a  classification  technique  that  allows  finding  a  function  of  variables 
that best distinguishes between two groups of firms, failing and non-failing, by maximizing the between-group 
variance while minimizing the within-group variance. In the case of linear MDA (the approach predominantly used 
by vendors), this function is a weighted linear combination of firm characteristics X :
D = a1 . X1 + a2 . X2 + ... + an . Xn ,
where D is the discriminant score (an indicator of the firms’ financial health), n refers to the number of firm 
characteristics used in the discriminant function and a stands for each variable’s coefficient.
Since the convention is to have low values of the discriminant score indicating a high credit risk, firms are classified 
in the failing group if D is lower than a certain cut-off C and in the non-failing group otherwise.
PRObit	anD	lOgit	mODElS
Probit and logit models are regression models that allow estimating the probability of firm failure p conditional on 
a set of firm characteristics X by a non-linear maximum-likelihood estimation procedure. A general formulation 
for both models is given by :
p = F (a1 . X1 + a2 . X2 + ... + an . Xn) ,
where F is either the standard normal distribution (probit model) or the logistic distribution (logit model) and a and 
n have the same interpretation as above.
Contrary to multiple discriminant analysis and probit (logit) regressions, which model the relationship of company 
failure with a number of variables, machine learning techniques such as neural networks, decision trees and 
maximum expected utility attempt to “ﾭlearn” this relationship from the data.
nEuRal	nEtWORkS
Neural networks (NN) are mathematical models that are inspired by the architecture of the human brain. Formally, 
NN consist of an input layer, which takes in firm information and passes it to downstream “ﾭneurons” ; inner layers, 
which transform this information using both linear and nonlinear (e.g. logit) functions ; and an output layer which 
receives the calculated output (failure prediction).
In the estimation process, neural networks are trained in order to minimize the deviation between the calculated 
and the actual output. The most commonly used method consists in adjusting the relevant weights in the linear 
transformation performed in the inner layers.
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2.    Failure prediction models offered by 
vendors : an application to Belgian 
data
This section compares the output of the National Bank 
of Belgium’s bankruptcy prediction model (NBB) and two 
vendor models (Model 1 and Model 2) when estimated 
using a set of non-financial Belgian firms with at least 
 employees. The three models are compared on the basis 
of predictions made using input data from 2001 and 2004 
and bankruptcy data between 2002 and 2006. More pre-
cisely, bankruptcies in 2002 and between 2002 and 2006 
are used to assess the one-year and five-year predictions 
made on the basis of 2001 data, while bankruptcies in 
200 are used to assess the one-year predictions made 
on the basis of 2004 data. The database contains almost 
30,000 firms in 2001 and nearly 40,000 in 2004.
The NBB model (see Vivet, 2004) is a logit model that pre-
dicts the risk of bankruptcy of Belgian firms using seven 
financial  variables  constructed  directly  from  the  firms’ 
annual accounts and an additional variable, the time (in 
days)  taken  by  firms  to  submit  their  annual  accounts. 
The financial variables include one variable for capitalisa-
tion, one measure of earnings, two measures of liquidity 
and three variables reflecting solvency. The two vendor 
models,  Model  1  and  Model  2,  use  different  statistical 
methods  and  are  based  on  different  inputs.  All  three 
models were calibrated on a set of failing and non-fail-
ing firms, where failure may represent default for some 
models and entry into bankruptcy for others.
Because not all of the models under consideration pro-
duce PDs, it is not possible to directly compare model out-
puts by examining PD estimates for each firm. However, 
it  is  possible  to  compare  the  ordinal  rankings  of  firms 
across the different models. A convenient way to make 
this comparison is as follows. First, for each model, order 
firms from lowest to highest credit risk based on their 
credit score or PD. Then, allocate the firms into a pre-
defined number of classes, or “ﾭbuckets”, according to a 
pre-defined distribution. (1) It is then possible to compare 
rates of model disagreement across classes, as well as the 
frequency of bankruptcy of the different classes.
There are differing motivations for defining internal rating 
systems with a higher versus a lower number of classes. 
Whereas a greater number of classes allows finer distinc-
tions to be made between firms, a system with a high 
number of classes may lead to anomalies whereby the 
observed  frequency  of  failure  for  higher-risk  classes  is 
lower than for lower-risk classes. For illustrative purposes, 
the analysis presented here makes use of seven risk classes. 
While the particular distribution was chosen to ensure that 
similar percentages of firms could be allocated from each 
model into each of the seven classes and to guarantee 
that, with only a small number of exceptions, bankruptcy 
frequencies of higher-risk classes are higher than frequen-
cies for lower-risk classes, none of the article’s qualitative 
results or conclusions depends upon the specific number 
(1)  The distribution used for illustrative purposes in this article is based loosely on the 
output of one of the three models. 
DEciSiOn	tREES
Decision trees (DT) are classification algorithms used to partition the data by employing variables to identify the 
subgroups that contribute most to explaining the dependent variable. Formally, DT consist of internal nodes with 
associated splitting predicates based on firm characteristics and final leafs with associated values (failure prediction).
The concept of entropy is most commonly used to determine on which firm variables the tree should be split.
maximum	ExPEctED	utility
Maximum expected utility (MEU) is a technique which can be used to model conditional default probabilities 
among other risk parameters. MEU allows finding a probability measure (failure prediction) that maximizes the 
out-of-sample expected utility of an investor who chooses his investment strategy so as to maximize this expected 
utility under the model he believes to be efficient.
Note that vendors may also combine some of the above-mentioned methodologies (e.g. multiple discriminant 
analysis and decision trees) in a hybrid approach.139
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of classes. Very similar results were obtained when using 
higher or lower numbers of classes. (1)
Table  1  reports  the  one-year  and  five-year  bankruptcy 
frequencies for each of the seven classes for each model. 
One-year frequencies are reported for the 2001 and 2004 
data,  while  five-year  frequencies  are  reported  for  the 
2001 data. (2) For each model, class 1 contains (roughly) 
the 1.4 percent of firms that are the least risky ; i.e., with 
the lowest PDs or highest credit scores. Class 7 contains 
(roughly) the 3.3 percent of firms that are the riskiest ; i.e., 
with the highest PDs or lowest credit scores. Classes 2 to 
 represent intermediate levels of risk and contain around 
20  p.c.  of  firms  each,  while  class  6  contains  around 
10 p.c. of firms.
Table  1  reveals  that  the  one-year  and  five-year  bank-
ruptcy  rates  are  generally  increasing  across  classes  and 
comparable across the three models, both in the 2001 
and 2004 samples, which suggests that the seven classes 
reflect increasing degrees of credit risk. Table 1 also shows 
changing bankruptcy frequency rates over time. Due to 
the cyclical downturn in 2001, the percentage of bank-
ruptcies in the entire sample was higher in 2002 (0.80) 
than  in  200  (0.6).  The  percentage  of  bankruptcies 
occurring  between  2002  and  2006  was  3.0  (0.70  on 
annual basis) in the entire sample.
(1)  Whereas Basel II requires having a minimum of seven buckets for non-defaulting 
borrowers and one for those that have defaulted, banks may work with internal 
ratings systems based on more than twenty-five buckets.
(2)  The distribution of firms in the 2001 sample is slightly different for one-year and 
five-year bankruptcy frequencies. This is because a number of firms have exited 
the database between 2002 and 2006 for reasons other than bankruptcy  
(e.g. mergers, acquisitions, etc.).
Table  1	 1-year and 5-year bankruptcy rates across classes for the three models
Class Percentages of firms Bankruptcy rates (percentages)
NBB Model 1 Model 2
1-year bankruptcy rates (2001 sample)
1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 0.21 0.00 0.00
2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21.7 0.05 0.03 0.18
3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21.2 0.09 0.07 0.18
4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18.6 0.31 0.26 0.33
5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21.8 0.74 0.77 0.91
6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.9 1.80 2.83 2.04
7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5 9.45 6.66 6.25
total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100.0 0.80 0.80 0.80
1-year bankruptcy rates (2004 sample)
1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21.3 0.00 0.01 0.06
3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21.7 0.10 0.07 0.11
4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18.9 0.23 0.17 0.21
5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22.0 0.33 0.43 0.56
6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.6 1.46 2.00 1.11
7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 7.74 5.64 7.00
total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100.0 0.56 0.56 0.56
5-year bankruptcy rates (2001 sample)
1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.6 0.96 0.23 1.20
2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21.7 0.78 0.49 1.15
3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22.9 1.33 1.38 1.59
4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19.4 2.87 2.57 3.03
5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19.9 4.68 5.76 4.42
6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.4 8.24 8.51 6.85
7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 18.24 14.61 19.38
total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100.0 3.50 3.50 3.50140
2.1  Analysis of model disagreement
One way to use the mapping presented in Table 1 is to 
identify firms which are classified very differently by two 
models. Table 2a presents disagreement rates for high-
risk firms (calculated as the percentage of class-7 firms 
of a given model which are classified in the median risk 
class, i.e., class 4, or below by another model). Table 2b 
shows disagreements for low-risk firms (calculated as the 
percentage of class-1 firms of a given model which are 
classified  in  the  median  risk-class  or  above  by  another 
model). Results are illustrated for the year 2004 (1-year 
predictions) ; however, results for 2001 (1-year and -year 
predictions) are quite similar.
A  number  of  observations  can  be  drawn  from  these 
tables. First, disagreement rates between the NBB model 
and  Model  1  are  much  higher  for  high-risk  firms  than 
for  low-risk  firms. (1)  However,  comparisons  of  the  NBB 
model with Model 2 and of Model 1 with Model 2 reveal 
that disagreement rates between these pairs of models 
are high for both high-risk and low-risk firms. The high 
disagreement rates between models suggests that if the 
pricing and origination of loans is a function of the class 
in which the firm is assigned, model choice can have a 
significant impact on loan decisions and pricing.
Of particular interest is whether disagreement between 
models  is  higher  for  firms  in  some  industries  than  in 
others.  This  question  is  investigated  for  disagreements 
relating to the high-risk firms in the following way. For a 
given model, firms classified in class 7 are identified. Then 
the number of these firms that were classified by another 
model in classes 1, 2, 3 or 4 is calculated. These firms 
are called “ﾭoutliers”. Outliers are added for each pair of 
models in order to obtain the total number of outliers for 
that model pair. Finally, the distribution of outliers across 
industries is examined using a classification system based 
on NACE at 2-digit level (2 sectors represented). Table 3 
(1)  Note that this observation would still hold even if the disagreement rates for low-
risk firms were doubled, to account for the smaller percentage of firms in class 1 
than class 7. 
Table  2a	 Disagreement for high-risk firms (2004)
(percentage of class-7 firms of a given model 
classified as 1, 2, 3 or 4 by another model)
Class 7 Class 1, 2, 3 or 4 Percentages of 
class-7 firms
NBB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Model 1 . . . . . . . . . . . 16.7
Model 2 . . . . . . . . . . . 13.8
Model 1 . . . . . . . . . . . NBB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.5
Model 2 . . . . . . . . . . . 15.4
Model 2 . . . . . . . . . . . NBB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18.0
Model 1 . . . . . . . . . . . 18.9
Table  2b	 Disagreement for low-risk firms (2004)
(percentage of class-1 firms of a given model 
classified as 4, 5, 6 or 7 by another model)
Class 1 Class 4, 5, 6 or 7 Percentages of 
class-1 firms
NBB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Model 1 . . . . . . . . . . . 0.8
Model 2 . . . . . . . . . . . 36.8
Model 1 . . . . . . . . . . . NBB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.7
Model 2 . . . . . . . . . . . 21.0
Model 2 . . . . . . . . . . . NBB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34.9
Model 1 . . . . . . . . . . . 29.3
Table  3	 Industry dIstrIbutIon of outlIers and sample fIrms, and 1-year bankruptcy rate of sample fIrms (2004)
(outliers = firms classified as 7 by one model and as 1, 2, 3 or 4 by the other model; industry classification system based on 52 sectors)











Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25.6 16.8 36.5 16.2 0.71
Wholesale trade and commission trade . . . . . . . . 9.2 9.6 5.5 15.0 0.45
Retail trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.5 7.3 6.7 9.8 0.46
Hotels and restaurants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.1 9.6 9.1 5.2 0.91
Land transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.9 6.5 4.1 5.9 0.77
Miscellaneous business activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.5 13.2 8.9 8.8 0.54
All other sectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32.1 37.0 29.1 38.8 0.64141
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reports the distribution of outliers and sample firms across 
industrial sectors accounting for at least  p.c. of the total 
number of outliers, as well as one-year bankruptcy rates 
of sample firms.
Several  observations  emerge  from  the  table.  First,  the 
share  of  outliers  in  the  construction  industry  is  signifi-
cantly higher than the share of sample observations in this 
sector. Indeed, the share of sample firms that are in the 
construction industry is only 16.2 p.c., whereas the per-
centage of outliers in this sector runs as high as 36. p.c. 
for  certain  model  comparisons.  Second,  the  share  of 
outliers in the hotels and restaurants and miscellaneous 
business activities sectors is also higher than the share of 
these sectors’ firms in the sample (.2 p.c. and 8.8 p.c., 
respectively). Third, the share of outliers in the retail trade 
and wholesale trade sectors is systematically lower than 
these  sectors’  shares  of  sample  observations  (9.8  p.c. 
and  1  p.c.,  respectively).  Finally,  bankruptcy  rates  are 
among the highest for the construction and hotels and 
restaurants sectors, i.e. two of the sectors whose share 
of  outliers  is  higher  than  their  share  of  sample  firms. 
This  suggests  that  it  may  be  more  difficult  to  identify 
the “ﾭtrue” financial condition of firms in industries with 
higher bankruptcy rates.
2.2  Analysis of model power
The above analysis is interesting in terms of its implications 
for loan origination and pricing decisions ; however, it sug-
gests nothing about the “ﾭpower” of the three models ; i.e., 
their ability to distinguish between failing and non-failing 
firms. Analysing the power of a model requires compar-
ing its output with actual bankruptcy data. In this section, 
the power of failure prediction models is compared using 
Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves (see Box 2 
for a description of ROC curves). Charts 1 and 2 present 
the  ROC  curves  for  one-year  and  five-year  bankruptcy 
rates based, respectively, on 2004 and 2001 data. Table 4 
reports the area below each of the curves. (1)
(1)  The ROC curves for which the areas have been calculated are ROC curves for 
the 7-class rating system, rather than the curves for the raw output of the three 
models (credit scores or PDs). The area under the ROC curve varies very little 
(around .02) when using the classes of a rating system instead of the actual 
output values of the model.
Box 2  –    ROC curves
The ROC (Receiver Operating Characteristic) curve is frequently used when comparing the accuracy of credit 
risk models. It is constructed by first ordering the non-failing firms from worst (highest risk) to best (lowest risk) 
from left to right on the horizontal axis. The vertical axis represents the percentage of all failing firms that would 
be captured at each percentile of non-failing firms on the horizontal axis. In other words, if x p.c. of non-failing 
firms (starting from the riskiest firm) were excluded from the sample, the vertical axis of the ROC curve gives the 
percentage of failing firms that would also be excluded (because they are ranked as equally risky or riskier than 
the least risky excluded non-failing firm).
ROC curves allow calculation of Type-1 and Type-2 errors at each point on the curve. The Type-1 error, or the 
error of labelling a non-failing firm as failing, corresponds to the percentage of non-failing firms excluded. The 
Type-2 error, or the error of labelling a failing firm as non-failing, equals the percentage of failing firms that is not 
excluded from the sample.
When the ROC curve of one model lies strictly above the ROC curve of another model (i.e., to the northwest), the 
former has unambiguously a lower Type-2 error rate for any given Type-1 error rate. When the ROC curves for two 
models cross, neither strictly dominates the other. In this situation, which model would be preferred would depend 
on the specific application one is interested in.
A convenient measure for summarizing the graph of the ROC curve is the area under the curve, which is calculated 
as the proportion of the area below the curve relative to the total area of the unit square. The area under the 
ROC curve may range from 0. (model with random classification) to 1.0 (model with perfect discrimination). The 
area may be interpreted as the probability that a randomly chosen failing firm is classified in a riskier class than a 
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CHART 1   1-YEAR ROC CURVE OF THE THREE MODELS 
BASED ON THE 7-CLASS SYSTEM (2004)
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CHART 2   5-YEAR ROC CURVE OF THE THREE MODELS 
BASED ON THE 7-CLASS SYSTEM (2001)
often regarded as having “ﾭacceptable” discriminatory power, while models with an area between .8 and .9 can 
be considered as having “ﾭexcellent” discriminatory power (see Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000).
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a SurvEy OF FailurE prEdiCTiON mOdElS OFFErEd by vENdOrS  
wiTh aN appliCaTiON TO bElgiaN daTa
Charts 1 and 2 illustrate that all three models perform 
considerably  better  than  would  a  random  selection  of 
firms, which is depicted by the 4 degree line. In fact, the 
values of the area under the ROC curves given in Table 4 
for each model would suggest that all three models exhibit 
excellent performance with respect to prediction of one-
year bankruptcy rates. Not surprisingly, the three models 
perform considerably better at the one-year than at the 
five-year  horizon.  Despite  this  excellent  performance, 
Model 2 appears to perform somewhat less well than the 
NBB model and Model 1, both at the one-year and five-
year horizons. For instance, with respect to the one-year 
ROC curves, we see that if the failure/non-failure cut-off 
was placed at the level of the twenty percent of non-fail-
ing firms with the lowest scores or highest PDs, the NBB 
model and Model 1 would pick up roughly 80 p.c. of all 
failing firms, compared to 70 p.c. for Model 2.
Chart  1  also  raises  the  question  as  to  whether  the 
relatively  high  levels  of  disagreement  between  models 
reported  in  Tables  2a  and  2b  might  be  related  to  the 
shape of and area under the ROC curves. For instance, 
the NBB model seems to be slightly better than Model 1 
at differentiating failing from non-failing firms among the 
riskiest firms, i.e. firms falling below the 1th percentile 
of the distribution of non-failing firms, whereas Model 1 
seems to perform slightly better than the NBB model for 
medium and low-risk firms. As a result, the overall per-
formance of both models (as measured by the area under 
the ROC curve) is very close.
The excellent, and relatively similar, performance of the 
three  models  considered  here  is  important,  given  that 
the statistical methods as well as the measure of failure 
(bankruptcy vs. default) used to estimate and calibrate the 
models are different. The latter result may suggest that 
the definition of failure used for model estimation and 
calibration does not matter as much as one might have 
expected. This observation, however, may be more true 
for Europe than the US. In fact, a much higher percentage 
of defaulting firms in Europe ultimately enter bankruptcy 
than in the US (Korablev, 200).
Conclusion
The development of Basel II has stimulated a number of 
vendors to develop a range of products including failure 
prediction models, which assess the risk of failure of obli-
gors. These models are often used by banks as an off-the-
shelf product or, alternatively, as a basis for development 
and benchmarking their own internal rating systems.
This article reviews the main characteristics of failure pre-
diction models for private firms offered by vendors and 
compares the output of two vendor models with a failure 
prediction  model  developed  by  the  NBB.  The  analysis, 
which makes use of bankruptcy data for Belgian firms, 
focuses on the extent of disagreement in firm rankings 
across models and on differences across models in the 
ability to predict firm failure.
A first finding is that there is considerable disagreement 
in firm rankings among the three models studied, and the 
extent of disagreement (e.g., firms classified as very high 
risk by one model but low risk by another) can be quite 
important.  Since  banks  use  failure  predictions  not  only 
as inputs in the calculation of their regulatory capital but 
also in several areas of credit risk management (e.g. loan 
pricing and loan origination), this result suggests that a 
bank’s model choice may have a significant impact on its 
loan granting and pricing decisions.
A second finding is that, overall, the three models under 
consideration perform similarly, and quite well, in distin-
guishing  bankrupt  and  non-bankrupt  firms.  This  result, 
which can be considered reassuring from a financial stabil-
ity viewpoint, is interesting in that the statistical methods 
as well as the measure of failure (bankruptcy vs. default) 
used to estimate and calibrate the models are different.
Finally, the high rates of disagreement observed among 
the  three  models  studied,  together  with  the  excellent 
performance of each, suggests that there may be some 
benefits  for  banks  in  combining  failure  assessments  of 
different models. The idea would be that the output of 
a  failure  prediction  model  represents  a  “ﾭsignal”  about 
the credit worthiness of a firm and, given that the signals 
produced by different models are not perfectly correlated, 
performance should be improved by making use of the 
combined information from multiple signals. One avenue 
for future research is to investigate the extent to which 
there  is  a  trade-off  between  combining  the  output  of 
more  models  versus  using  fewer  models  with  superior 
performance. (1)
(1)  For further investigation of this and other issues, see Mitchell and Van Roy 
(2007).
Table  4	 AreA under the 1-yeAr	And 5-yeAr
rOC	Curves
Model 1-year ROC (2004) 5-year ROC (2001)
NBB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.873 0.743
Model 1 . . . . . . . . . . . 0.866 0.753
Model 2 . . . . . . . . . . . 0.834 0.714144
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